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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 09-3562 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RAFAEL DOMINGUEZ, 
        Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-07-cr-00064-004) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 18, 2012 
_______________ 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 19, 2012) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Rafael Dominguez pled guilty to criminal forfeiture and conspiracy to distribute 
and possess cocaine hydrochloride in March 2009.  The District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania sentenced Dominguez five months later, and he filed a timely 
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notice of appeal.  Subsequently, Dominguez’s attorney moved to withdraw as counsel 
under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that all potential grounds for 
appeal are frivolous.  Dominguez has filed a pro se brief in support of his appeal.  We 
grant his counsel’s Anders motion, affirm the judgment and sentence of the District 
Court, and dismiss without prejudice the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that 
Dominguez asserts for the first time on appeal. 
I. 
 A federal grand jury charged Dominguez with (1) conspiracy to distribute and 
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) distribution and possession with intent to distribute five 
kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) 
distribution and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and (4) criminal forfeiture in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 853. 
 Over a year later, the Government filed a two-count superseding felony 
information that charged only the first and fourth offenses on the indictment.  At the same 
time, Dominguez pled guilty to those two charges in a written plea agreement.  That 
agreement included a waiver of his rights to direct and collateral appeal. 
 The District Court then held a plea hearing.  There, it addressed Dominguez 
through a Spanish-language interpreter.  Dominguez affirmed that he could understand 
the Court’s questions through the interpreter.  In the ensuing plea colloquy, the Court 
advised Dominguez that he had rights to direct and collateral appeals and that his plea 
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agreement waived those rights.  Dominguez indicated that he understood and agreed.  
The Court further ensured that Dominguez had read and understood the waiver provision 
in his plea agreement. 
 After the Court accepted Dominguez’s plea but before the sentencing hearing, 
Dominguez moved to withdraw his plea.  He asserted that he had not properly understood 
the interpreter at his plea hearing and that he was not in possession of drugs when he was 
arrested.  The Court denied his motion and sentenced him to 121 months of 
imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, a $100 special assessment, and three years of supervised 
release. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II. 
A. 
 Our rules provide that “[w]here, upon review of the district court record, counsel 
is persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a 
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders.”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  
If we concur with trial counsel’s assessment, we “will grant [the] Anders motion, and 
dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel.”  Id.  Accordingly, our “inquiry is 
. . . twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) 
whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United 
States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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 In his Anders brief, Dominguez’s counsel identifies three potential grounds for 
appeal: (1) that Dominguez’s waiver of appeal was not knowing and voluntary; (2) that 
the waiver of appeal would result in a miscarriage of justice; and (3) that the District 
Court abused its discretion in denying Dominguez’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  
Our review of the record confirms counsel’s assessment that there are no nonfrivolous 
issues for direct appeal. 
 First, “we will not exercise . . . jurisdiction to review the merits of [Dominguez’s] 
appeal if we conclude that []he knowingly and voluntarily waived [his] right to appeal.”  
United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).  Save for Dominguez’s pro 
se brief, which we address below in section II.B, the record offers no indication that 
Dominguez’s waiver was not knowing and voluntary.  The plea agreement states that he 
had a right to appeal.  It then adds: “Acknowledging all of this, the defendant knowingly 
waives the right to appeal any conviction and sentence . . . .”  The District Court asked 
Dominguez whether he had “carefully reviewed this paragraph with [his] attorney,” and 
Dominguez responded that he had.  The Court separately advised Dominguez of his 
appeal rights and asked: “Do you understand that this plea agreement severely limits your 
right to appeal and prevents you from using later proceedings like a collateral attack and 
habeas corpus to challenge your conviction, sentence, or any other matter?”  Dominguez 
again affirmed that understanding.  With this colloquy, the Court ensured Dominguez’s 
understanding of “the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal 
or to collaterally attack the sentence.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). 
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 Second, we may nonetheless exercise appellate jurisdiction if enforcing the waiver 
of appeal “would work a miscarriage of justice.”  Gwinnett, 483 F.3d at 203.  In making 
that determination, we consider, among other factors, “the clarity of the error, its gravity, 
its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory 
maximum), the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the error on 
the government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result.”  United 
States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 242-43 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Because 
the record does not reveal a specific error, we agree that enforcement of Dominguez’s 
waiver would not work a miscarriage of justice. 
 Third, even if we act on our jurisdiction, we agree that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Dominguez’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  “A 
district court must consider three factors when evaluating a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea: (1) whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength of the defendant’s 
reasons for withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced 
by the withdrawal.”  United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).  The 
District Court expressly addressed these factors at the sentencing hearing.  Dominguez 
did not assert his innocence, and his active participation in the plea colloquy undermines 
his claim that he did not understand the interpreter. 
 In sum, the record indicates that Dominguez made a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of his right to appeal, that enforcing that waiver would not work a miscarriage of 
justice, and that even if we accepted jurisdiction, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Dominguez’s motion to withdraw his plea.  We therefore agree with 
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Dominguez’s counsel that none of the conditions that could overcome an appellate 
waiver exists here and that there is no nonfrivolous basis on which he may appeal at this 
time. 
B. 
 Dominguez attempts to supplement the record in his pro se brief.  Specifically, he 
alleges that his plea agreement, including its waiver provision, was not knowing and 
voluntary due to certain advice he received from counsel.  The affidavit that Dominguez 
has attached to his brief is the only evidence before us concerning these allegations. 
 “It has long been the practice of this court to defer the issue of ineffectiveness of 
trial counsel to a collateral attack.”  United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 
2003); see also United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d 547, 555-56 (3d Cir. 2004).1
                                              
1 We have recognized an exception to this practice where “the record is sufficient to 
allow determination of the issue.”  Thornton, 327 F.3d at 271.  That exception does not 
apply here. 
  
Those claims typically involve facts that are not developed in the record, and our Court is 
ill suited to developing the facts.  “When an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on 
direct appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record not 
developed precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and thus often 
incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.”  Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 
504-05 (2003).  Those problems are exacerbated where, as here, the same counsel was 
appointed to represent the defendant both at trial and on direct appeal. 
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 The appropriate way for Dominguez to challenge the effectiveness of his counsel, 
and thus the voluntariness of his appeal waiver, is an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We express no opinion on the merits of his 
ineffectiveness claim at this time.  We do note, however, that our decision not to decide 
this issue may not be construed as a bar to an ineffectiveness claim in a collateral 
challenge.  See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 509. 
*    *    *    *    * 
 Counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Anders.  We therefore grant 
counsel’s motion to withdraw, affirm the judgment and sentence of the District Court, 
and dismiss without prejudice the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
 
